Although men live, move, and have their being in God, they remain free, or self-determining, beings, who are personally responsible to God for whatever they do (libertas a coactione, freedom from coercion). This truth is taught in Scripture, Acts 17, 30, and is supported by experience. (Rom.1, 32: "Who, knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death.")
In this connection we may consider also the question: "Must things happen just as they do happen (necessitas immutabilitatis), or could they happen otherwise (contingentia rerum)? On the basis of Scripture we maintain both the necessitas immutabilitatis and the contingentia rerum; the first, from the viewpoint of divine providence; the second, from the viewpoint of human responsibility. Thus the betrayal, condemnation, and death of Christ had to occur since God by His gracious plan of salvation had decreed all this to happen from eternity, Acts 4, 27. 28; ·Matt. 26, 54. Yet neither Judas nor Pilate was coerced by God to perpetrate the crimes by which the Savior was delivered into death, Luke 22, 21-23; Matt. 26, 24; John 19, 12. For this reason our dogmaticians have said: Ratione providentiae Dei, quae omnia regit, necessaria omnia fieri recte dicuntur; respectu hom in is lib ere et contingenter res fiunt et aguntur omnia in rebus humanis. If the necessitas is denied, the alternative is atheism or epicureanism ("Things happen without God"); if the contingentia is denied, the alternative is fatalism or Stoicism ("Man is coerced to sin").
In view of the fact that "with respect to man all things happen freely and contingently" (respectu hominis lib ere et contingenter res fiunt), man is bound, both in the realm of nature and of grace, to the means which God has appointed for his welfare. In bodily sickness he must apply medicine; for the sickness of his soul he must apply the means of grace (the Word and the Sacraments), through which God works and preserves faith, Rom. 10, 17. It is both foolish and sinful to try to ascertain divine providence a priori, by setting aside the divinely prescribed means; for in that case we arrogantly endeavor to explore God in His sovereign majesty (Luther: in nuda maiestate) and thus tempt Him, Matt. 4, 6. 7.
Similar to the truth just discussed is the question concerning the end of human life (terminus vitae). Also here we must maintain both the necessity and the contingency. For Scripture teaches, on the one hand, that the days of a man are so determined that he cannot pass the appointed bounds, Job 14, 5; this is said with respect to divine providence (ratione providentiae Dei). On the other hand, Scripture teaches that God often changes the natural limit of human life with respect both to the godly and the wicked. He prolongs the life of the godly either as a reward for their obedience, Ex. 20, 12; Prov. 3, 1. 2; 4, 10, or for the common good of His Church, 2 Cor. 1, 10. 11; Phil. 1, 23. 24; or He shortens their life to preserve them from distress and evil, Is. 57, 1. 2. Whenever God shortens the life of the wicked, this is to be regarded as a just punishment for their wickedness, Gen. 38, 7. 10. All this, however, is said respectu hominis, or from the viewpoint of contingency.
From the viewpoint of contingency (respectu hominis) we must therefore say that the limit of human life is not absolutely and immutably decreed, Is. 38, 5. For the sake of clearness our dogmaticians have also said that men die either by the dispensing or by the permissive providence of God; that is to say, if men use the prescribed means (Acts 27, 33 ff. : food; 1 Tim. 5, 23: medicine; Eph. 6, 2. 3: piety; 2 Kings 20, 1-6 : prayer; Acts 9, 25: avoidance of danger, etc.), they will by the grace of God attain to that limit of life which His dispensing providence has fixed; but if they reject the prescribed means, transgress His divine laws, and live wickedly, their life will be shortened by His permissive providence, 2 Sam. 18, 14; 17, 23; Gen. 9, 6; Ex. 21, 12, etc. All Scripture-passages that describe the terminus vitae in terms of contingency must be regarded as a gracious condescension on the part of God to our feeble understanding in order that we may use for our admonition or consolation the divine truths which He has graciously revealed for our temporal and eternal good. But even in cases where life is shortened or lengthened, God must not be regarded as mutable in His essence or decrees, since what appears to us as either shortening or lengthening of life has been decreed by Him from eternity. In other words, man dies exactly when God has willed that he should die, Luke 12, 20; 2, 26; Phil. 1, 23. 24; Judg. 6, 23; Ps. 90, 3-10. Beyond this our thoughts dare not go since Scripture itself sets this limit.